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Abstract. Ecosystem externalities arise when one use of an ecosystem
aﬀects its other uses through the production functions of the ecosystem.
We use simulations with a size-spectrum ecosystem model to investigate the
ecosystem externality created by ﬁshing of multiple species. The model is
based upon general ecological principles and is calibrated to the North Sea.
Two ﬂeets are considered: a “forage ﬁsh” ﬂeet targeting species that mature
at small sizes and a “large ﬁsh” ﬂeet targeting large piscivorous species. Based
on the marginal analysis of the present value of the rent, we develop a beneﬁt
indicator that explicitly divides the consequences of ﬁshing into internal and
external beneﬁts. This analysis demonstrates that the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet has a
notable economic impact on the large ﬁsh ﬂeet, but the reverse is not true.
The impact can be either negative or positive, which entails that for optimal
economic exploitation, the forage ﬁshery has to be adjusted according to the
large ﬁsh ﬁshery. With the present large ﬁsh ﬁshery in the North Sea, the
two ﬁsheries are well adjusted; however, the present combined exploitation
level is too high to achieve optimal economic rents.
Key Words: Ecosystem externalities, forage ﬁsh, beneﬁt indicator,
marine ecosystems, ﬁsheries management, size-based, North Sea.
1. Introduction. When a ﬁsh stock is ﬁshed, the impact of that ﬁshing will
also aﬀect the other stocks in the ecosystem. For example, ﬁshing piscivorous species
should have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on their prey, whereas ﬁshing forage species should
have a detrimental eﬀect on their predators. Fishing on a stock therefore incurs
an opportunity cost on other ﬁsheries in terms of a possible smaller outcome. In
economic terms, this means that a ﬁshing ﬂeet not only aﬀects its own outcome
but also, through the ecosystem, imposes externalities on other ﬂeets and ecosys-
tem users. If ﬁshery management is to move beyond the traditional single stock
approach, the opportunity cost of catch from diﬀerent stocks has to be apparent.
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Our aim is to evaluate how one use of an ecosystem, here one ﬂeet, indirectly aﬀects
other users, here other ﬂeets, and to develop a beneﬁt indicator that demonstrates
this opportunity cost. By dividing the economic consequences into internal and ex-
ternal beneﬁts, we elucidate how the ﬁshing ﬂeets aﬀect each other and thereby
provide guidance into possible trade-oﬀs between ﬁshing ﬂeets in the exploitation
of the ecosystem.
In ﬁsheries there are traditionally identiﬁed three externalities: (i) stock external-
ities, (ii) mesh externalities, and (iii) crowding externalities (Smith [1969]). Stock
externalities refer to the forgone future harvest caused by a decrease in stock,
mesh externalities refer to the damage to the habitat made by the ﬁsheries gear,
and crowding externalities refer to the increase in operation costs caused by ves-
sel congestion at the ﬁshing ground. Crocker and Tschirhart [1992] examined a
predator–prey–grain system and use the term ecosystem externality for the part of
the economic change originating—not from the direct manipulating of a species,
but—through the ecosystem via other species. In this paper, we analyze the eco-
nomic impact imposed by one ﬁshery on other ﬁsheries through the functionality
of the ecosystem. As Crocker and Tschirhart [1992], we use the term ecosystem
externality for this indirect impact and see it as a complement to the three other
externalities identiﬁed by Smith [1969]. Ryan et al. [2014] use the term ecosystem
externality for the change in future harvest generated by a change in underlying
biological productivity of a ﬁsh stock by impacting the forage or habitat quantity
or quality. While this may be covered by Crocker and Tschirhart’s [1992] deﬁnition,
we note that the phenomena of Ryan et al. [2014] is similar to Smith’s [1969] mesh
externalitiy.
Accounting for the interaction between ﬂeets requires an ecosystem model that
captures the multispecies nature of the ecosystem. Purely data-driven approaches,
e.g., analysis of catch data, are unable to provide an understanding of the drivers
and dynamics within an ecosystem. One approach in the ﬁshery economics liter-
ature is to use simple conceptual models to obtain qualitative insights on ecosys-
tems (Hannesson [1983], [2002]). The most common approach is to investigate the
interaction of two or more trophic levels using Lotka–Volterra-type predator–prey
models, e.g., May et al. [1979], Flaaten [1988], Wilen and Wilen [2012]. Such models
capture the predator–prey interactions of diﬀerent species, however, by character-
izing each species by its biomass only, they fail to account for the large variation in
size within each species. Individuals within a ﬁsh species varies in size from about
0.001 g to their asymptotic size of between about 10 g for forage ﬁsh and between
10 and 100 kg for the largest predatory ﬁsh. The size of individuals characterizes
their interaction with other individuals (big individuals eat smaller ones), their
bioenergetics, ﬁsheries gear selectivity and, more important in this context, their
economic value. To adequately resolve the ecological and the economic reality of
the ecosystem, we therefore use a size-based model of the ecosystem.
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There is a growing literature describing diﬀerent types of size-spectrum models
(Benoˆıt and Rochet [2004], Hall et al. [2006], Pope et al. [2006], Hartvig et al.
[2011]) and their application to understanding how marine ecosystems respond
to ﬁshing (Hall et al. [2006], Pope et al. [2006], Andersen and Pedersen [2010],
Blanchard et al. [2014]). These models are based on a few simple and generally
accepted assumptions at the level of the individual organisms and their dynamics
are explicitly driven by predation and individual growth. Individuals in the model
are characterized by their size (weight). As ﬁshing gear is size-selective and the
prices of landed ﬁsh also depend upon size, these models are ideally suited for
economic reasoning and calculations. A central diﬀerence between a size-spectrum
model and an unstructured Lotka–Volterra model is that it resolves the competition
between individuals of the same size but from diﬀerent species, e.g., the competition
between an adult herring and a juvenile saithe. We use a previously developed and
calibrated size-spectrum model to represent the ecological reality of the ecosystem
(Hartvig et al. [2011], Andersen et al. [2015]). We use the model to calculate how a
change in ﬁshing on one ﬂeet aﬀects the abundance and sizes of ﬁsh target by other
ﬂeets.
To illustrate the applicability of the beneﬁt indicator, we use the North Sea ﬁshery
as a case. For this system, data for the value of the diﬀerent ﬁsh species, broken
down into size groups, are available. To simplify the description, we focus on the
internal and external beneﬁts of two ﬂeets: the forage ﬂeet targeting small species,
and the consumer ﬂeet targeting large species. We use the beneﬁt indicator to show
that the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet has a notable economic impact on the large ﬁsh ﬂeet,
but that the reverse is not true. The impact can be either negative or positive
depending upon the level of exploitation in the system, i.e., forage ﬁshing may even
have positive externality on the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. For the North Sea, we ﬁnd that
at the current level of large ﬁsh ﬁshery, the level of the forage ﬁsh ﬁshery leads
to an adequate externality. To achieve the optimal total beneﬁt from ﬁshing the
ecosystem, however, the present combined exploitation level must be reduced.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The biological model is brieﬂy explained
in Section 2, the beneﬁt indicator is derived in Section 3, the economic model is
developed in Section 4, and our results are presented in Section 5 and discussed
in Section 6. In the electronic supporting material, there is additional information
on: the estimation of the cost parameters (A), the estimation of the price model
(B), the details of the biological model (C), the sensitivity analysis of some of the
cost parameters (D), and the sensitivity of the model to the choice of the control
variable (E).
2. Ecosystem model. The size- and trait-based model is well described else-
where (Hartvig et al. [2011], Andersen et al. [2015]), and we only provide a general
description of the basic principles here. The aim of a trait-based size-spectrum
model is to calculate the abundance distribution of individuals, N(w,W ), as a
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function of the size of the individuals, w, and the asymptotic (maximum) size that
the individual may reach, W .
The model is built upon a bioenergetic budget of an individual predator that
connects somatic growth with the predation mortality inﬂicted on its prey. The
model is based on three fundamental assumptions:
(i) Trophic interactions (predation) are described by big individuals eating small
individuals. A predator will prefer to eat prey that is roughly 100 times smaller
than themselves (Ursin [1973], Jennings et al. [2001]).
(ii) The main trait describing diﬀerences between species is the asymptotic size W
(Andersen and Beyer [2006], Pope et al. [2006]). This diﬀerence is embodied in
the description of somatic growth, where growth slows down as the individual
matures and approaches the asymptotic size (Lester et al. [2004]), in a manner
consistent with a traditional “von Bertalanﬀy” growth curve commonly used to
describe ﬁsh growth (Andersen and Beyer [2015]). The asymptotic size is used
as a continuous variable. This circumvents the need to represent speciﬁc species;
the diversity of the ﬁsh community is instead characterized by the abundance
of individuals in the W dimension of the abundance distribution N(w,W ).
(iii) The impact of stock biomass and food on recruitment can be ignored. This is
achieved by ﬁxing the density of ﬁsh of size 10−3 g. This means that the model
does not resolve “recruitment overﬁshing” occurring at high ﬁshing pressures.
This is purposefully done so that all eﬀects can be traced back to the predator–
prey interactions. Note that common age-based models of ﬁsh populations op-
erate with recruitment at ﬁnite age, typically at age 1 year. The high prerecruit
mortality found in those models is explicitly represented in the present model.
By resolving the entire life from age 0 to the commonly used age of recruit-
ment, the model explicitly resolves the high prerecruit mortality prescribed in
age-based models.
In addition to the central assumptions, the model relies on minor assumptions
related to the exact description of the predator–prey encounter (the functional
response), and the bioenergetic budget (supporting material C). These follow com-
monly accepted methodology for modeling ﬁsh and predator–prey interactions. All
of the parameters in the size-spectrum model are related to individual weight, which
makes it possible to formulate the model with a small set of general parameters,
prompting the labeling of the model as “charmingly simple” (Pope et al. [2006]).
The model simulates 1 m3 of water, and output is scaled to the North Sea vol-
ume. The equations and parameters of the models are described in supporting
material C.
The model resolves the entire life of individuals from a size w0 to the asymptotic
size of all species (Figure 1A). The predator–prey interaction leads to a decrease in
prey abundances and to somatic growth (production) of predator individuals. The
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FIGURE 1. Run of the model with the ﬁshing mortality of the two ﬂeets set to correspond
with the current exploitation of the North Sea. Solid lines represent the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet,
dashed lines the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. (A) Density of ﬁsh, Ni (w), as a function of individual weight,
w. Each thin line represents a population that is characterized by the maximum size, W , of
individuals in the population. The thick black line is the sum of all of the populations. The
smallest individuals feed on the plankton community (gray line). (B) Fishing size-selection
function, ω(w). (C) The density of the harvest. The total harvest is the integral under the
curves; however, as the abscissa represents the size on the logarithmic scale, the areas under
the curves are scaled by the logarithm of their size to be visual comparable: the plotted line
is FωNw log(w).
somatic growth in the model is equivalent to individuals moving to the right on the
size axis. All energy originates from the plankton community, and it is the size of
this that determines the productivity of the system.
To resolve the opportunity costs of ﬁshing at diﬀerent trophic levels, the ﬁshery
is divided into two ﬂeets: one targeting small forage ﬁsh and one targeting large
piscivorous ﬁsh. In this context, forage ﬁsh refer to ﬁsh that are prey all of their life.
The forage fish fleet is then characterized by catching small ﬁsh from ﬁsh species
that mature at small sizes, and their harvest is used for industrial reduction into
ﬁshmeal and oil. The large fish fleet catches piscivorous ﬁsh, i.e., ﬁsh species that
are relatively large when mature, and are sold for direct human consumption.
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Fishing in the model is represented by the product of the overall ﬁshing mortality,
F , and the selectivity as a function of size and trait, ω(w,W ). The two ﬂeets are
characterized by the range of asymptotic sizes they target; the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet
targets species with W < 512 g (solid lines Figure 1A), and the large ﬁsh ﬂeet targets
W ≥ 512 g (dashed lines Figure 1A). Hence the two ﬂeets ﬁshery are nonoverlapping
with respect to species. The overall ﬁshing mortality rate of the two ﬂeets, (Ff,Fl),
is the control variable in the model. The size-selectivity is modeled as a trawl
selectivity curve with an S-shaped function (Figure 1B). The output of the ecological
model is the harvest with respect to ﬁsh size (Figure 1C), which gives the revenue
when multiplied by price and integrated over all sizes.
3. Benefit indicator. To value the ecosystem-wide eﬀects of ﬁshing, we de-
velop a beneﬁt indicator. The indicator is the marginal change in the present value
of the rent when the system is brought from one steady state to another, taking the
dynamic eﬀects of the ecosystem during the change explicitly into consideration.
A change of state is prompted through a change in the ﬁshing pressure of one of
the ﬁshing ﬂeets. The consequences of a change are characterized by the internal
benefit of the ﬂeet that imposes the change and the external benefit experienced by
the other ﬂeet.
Each ﬂeet has one control variable, the overall ﬁshing mortality rate (Ff,Fl),
where Ff is for the ﬂeet targeting forage ﬁsh and Fl is for the ﬂeet targeting larger
ﬁsh. We deﬁne continue as usual as keeping a constant F and an action as changing
F . To generalize the method, the two ﬂeets are called i and j, where (i, j) can be
either (f, l) or (l, f).
The ecosystem services generated by the ﬂeets i and j are the harvests yi and
yj —appraised by the rents (net values) πi and πj . Harvests and the rents vary
through time; to include the time component, the beneﬁt of ﬂeet i is summarized
by Yi and Vi , which are the present value of the harvest and the rent, respectively,
using the social discount rate ρ (equivalent for ﬂeet j):
Yi :=
∫ ∞
0
yi(t)e−ρtdt,(1)
Vi :=
∫ ∞
0
πi(t)e−ρtdt.(2)
We consider a baseline situation where the ecosystem is in equilibrium with its
ﬂeets and the outputs are constant. We consider a change in the harvest of ﬂeet
i prompted by a change in Fi ; the system will then no longer be in equilibrium.
Because of the restriction imposed by the ecosystem functions, the change in ﬂeet
i’s harvest will lead to changes in the harvest and rent for ﬂeet j as well. As ﬂeet
j is continue as usual, the changes in this ﬂeet are an externality.
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Because the change in Vj will depend upon Δyi(t), we use a concept from cost-
eﬀectiveness analysis (Garber and Phelps [1997], Kronbak and Vestergaard [2013])
and evaluate ΔVj/ΔYi . We deﬁne the beneﬁt indicator, Bj/i , of ﬂeet j’s rent per
unit of ﬂeet i’s harvest at the limit, ΔYi → 0.
This deﬁnition is incomplete in itself. To make it rigorous, it has to be combined
with the previous deﬁnitions of continue as usual and an action. We depart from

N(Fi ,Fj ) an ecosystem in equilibrium with (Fi ,Fj ), that is a situation where both
ﬂeets continue as usual for a very long time.
Depart from:Nt=0 =

N(Fi ,Fj ).(3)
At t = 0, ﬂeet i changes the ﬁshing mortality while ﬂeet j continues as usual. To
measure the indicator, we expand the deﬁnition with the control variable:
Bj/i = lim
ΔYi→0
ΔVj
ΔYi
,(4)
= lim
ΔFi→0
ΔVj
ΔFi
(
ΔYi
ΔFi
)−1
(5)
=
(
lim
→0
Vj (Fi + ,Fj )− Vj (Fi − ,Fj )
2
)
·
(
lim
→0
Yi(Fi + ,Fj )− Yi(Fi − ,Fj )
2
)−1
(6)
= lim
→0
Vj (Fi + ,Fj )− Vj (Fi − ,Fj )
Yi(Fi + ,Fj )− Yi(Fi − ,Fj ) .(7)
As only i is doing an action, only Fi is changed in line (5). The deviation is ex-
panded from both sides in line (6) to allow for more precision in the numerical
implementation.
The beneﬁt indicator of the ﬂeet itself, Bi/i , can be calculated in a similar fashion.
Bi/i does not measure an externality,1 but it is the net beneﬁt to the ﬂeet of
removing one more ﬁsh, ignoring the externality of the ﬁshing on the other ﬂeet.
The total beneﬁt indicator per unit of ﬂeet i’s harvest is
B•/i := Bi/i + Bj/i,(8)
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where the • indicates “summed over all ﬂeets.” This beneﬁt is the total net beneﬁt
of removing one more ﬁsh, including opportunity costs. Here, only two ﬂeets are
considered, but the expression can be generalized to an arbitrary number of ﬂeets
by summing over all of the ﬂeets. The beneﬁt will be a function of the current state
of the ecosystem, and if the total beneﬁt is positive (negative), then it will, from an
economic point of view, be beneﬁcial to increase (decrease) the harvest. If B•/i = 0
for both ﬂeets, then a marginal change in the harvest will leave the present value of
the rent ﬂow unchanged. Such a point is a candidate for a situation with optimal
economic use of the ecosystem.
3.1. Model simulations. The deployed ecosystem model does not allow for
an analytical solution for ﬁnding the beneﬁt indicator. This section describes how
the limit (7) is estimated with numerical experiments on the model, and how
the continuous formulation (1) and (2) are approximated with equivalent discreet
formulation.
The estimation is performed by allowing the model to run with mortality rates Fi
and Fj until it converges to equilibrium

N(Fi ,Fj ).2 Two experiments, A and B,
that depart from the equilibrium are performed; in both experiments, the ﬁshing
mortality of ﬂeet j is ﬁxed while the ﬁshing mortality of ﬂeet i is changed: Fi(A) =
(1− )Fi and Fi(B) = (1 + )Fi . The change in ﬁshing mortality leads to a dynamic
response of the ecosystem model. The experiment is run for T = 50 years, and the
system converges to a new equilibrium. We use  = 10−6 as a suitable compromise
between precision (close to the limit  → 0) and numerical noise (the signal is large
relative to rounding errors in computation).
The harvest ﬂows, yi(A) and yi(B), and the rent ﬂows, πj (A) and πj (B), are
recorded (the bold symbols indicates that the ﬂows are discrete in time and repre-
sented as vectors π = (πΔt , π2Δt , . . . , πT )). All of the vectors are of length T/Δt,
where Δt is the time step in the model. The changes in the present values are then
calculated as:
ΔVj = PV (πj (B)− πj (A)),(9)
ΔYi = PV (yi(B)− yi(A)).(10)
The integrals involved in the present values are estimated as:
PV (π) =
∑
t∈{Δt,2Δt,...,T }
ρ−1
(
e−(t−Δt)ρ − e−tρ
)
πt + e−T ρ
πT
ρ
.(11)
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Here,
∑
(· · ·) calculates the present value from t = 0 to t = T , and e−T ρπTρ−1
estimates the present value from t = T to t = ∞.
Finally, the beneﬁt indicator is estimated as
Bj/i =
ΔVj
ΔYi
.(12)
4. Economic model.
4.1. Two views on production in fisheries. In a traditional ﬁsheries model
(e.g., Getz and Haight, [1989], chapter 4), the harvest is calculated by summing the
contributions from all of the diﬀerently sized groups that are ﬁshed. In the size-
spectrum model, this is an integral over the abundance distribution with respect to
size, N(w), weighted by the size-selectivity of the ﬁshing gear, ω(w):
y = F
∫ ∞
0
ω(w)N(w)w dw,(13)
where F is the overall ﬁshing mortality.
Fisheries economists tend to use a production model instead, where the harvest, y,
is the production of a ﬁshing vessel with the factor inputs of eﬀort, E, and stock, S,
where the ﬁsh stock is an environmental variable.3 The traditional approximation
is to apply a Cobb–Douglas production function (e.g., Clark [1990] equation 2.8):
y = qEαSγ ,(14)
where q is the total factor productivity and α is the output elasticity with respect
to eﬀort, that is, how the harvest will relative increase (decrease) with respect to
a relative increase (decrease) in eﬀort. The γ is the output elasticity with respect
to stock, and is normally expect to be found in the range γ ∈ [0, 1), and with
smaller values for schooling ﬁsh compared to benthic ﬁsh (e.g., Sandberg [2006]).
The assumption of ﬁxed catch per unit eﬀort (CPUE) found in some ﬁshery models
(e.g., Schaefer [1954]) is equivalent to (α, γ) = (1, 1) (in this context q is often called
the catchability coeﬃcient). The Cobb–Douglas (14) is then a more sophisticated
production view that allows for declining productivity with respect to input factors.
The total production of the ﬂeet is the sum of the productions of each vessel.
Assuming identical vessel and eﬀort levels, total production will have the same
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form as individual production:
y = n q
(
Etotal
n
)α
Sγ
= q′EαtotalS
γ ,(15)
where n is the number of vessels, and q′ = n1−αq. Hence, the total harvest function
will be a scaled version of (14).
The two views on production can be uniﬁed by deﬁning the stocks as:
S :=
∫ ∞
0
ω(w)N(w)w dw(16)
and the overall ﬁshing mortality rate as:
F := q′EαtotalSγ−1(17)
In this manner, the economic production view (15) and the model (13) will give
the same production, y.
The function Sγ−1 in the overall ﬁshing mortality rate (17) will, with the expec-
tation of γ ∈ [0, 1) being a convex decreasing function, indicating declining produc-
tivity with respect to increasing stock.
4.2. Cost model. Eﬀort is an ambiguous concept; economists prefer to work
with physical input factors such as labor, fuel, and provision (see, e.g., Squires
[1988]):
y = q1x
α1
1 x
α2
2 · · · kβSγ(18)
where x1 , x2 , . . . are input factors, and k is capital. α1 , α2 , . . . are output elasticities
with respect to the inputs factors, and β is the output elasticity with respect to
capital. Given (18), with corresponding prices pi and a ﬁsher assumed to minimize
cost, the input factors are applied such that
xi
xj
=
αi
αj
pj
pi
.(19)
Equations (18) and (19) give a production cost relationship
y = q2GαkβSγ ,(20)
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where
G = p · x,(21)
α =
∑
αi,(22)
q2 = q1
(∑ pi
αi
)α ∏
i
(
αi
pi
)αi
.(23)
The production function (20) can replace (14) to allow for the estimation of a
production function based on the accounting statistics for the individual vessel,
which avoids the introduction of eﬀort. It may seem equivalent to a ﬁxed price
on eﬀort, however, by assuming cost minimization, we allow for substitution when
relative prices between factors change (see supporting material A).
Our objective is to analyze the ecosystem model from a long-run perspective.
Therefore, we will derive a cost function under the assumption that all of the factor
inputs of the ﬁshing ﬂeet are completely variable, which allows us to minimize both
the operational and the capital costs.
With pk as the price of capital, the total cost per vessel is C = G + kpk . If we
assume that the ecosystem is in a steady state with a total harvest of y, then the
cost minimization problem is to ﬁnd the number of vessels, n, the operation cost,
G, and the capital, k, such that
(n,G, k) =
argmin
n,G,k
n (G + kpk )
∣∣∣∣
y=nqGα kβ Sγ
.(24)
By substituting n
(n,G, k) =
argmin
n,G,k
y
G + kpk
qGαkβSγ
∣∣∣∣
n= y
qGα kβ S γ
(25)
the cost minimization problem can be solved by ﬁrst ﬁnding the operation cost
and capital level where the unit cost is minimized, and then the number of vessels.
Minimizing the unit cost implies that the input factors are applied in the ratio:
G
kpk
=
α
β
(26)
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and, because we are looking for the long-run optimal level of capital, α + β = 1.
The total cost per vessel is then
C = G + pkk = G
(
1 +
β
α
)
=
G
α
.(27)
The unit costs are
C
y
=
G
α
q
(
β
αpk
)β
Gα+βSγ
= AS−γ ,(28)
where
A = q−1β−βαβ−1pβk .(29)
If we do the analysis from a long-run perspective and assume an ideal cost min-
imizing ﬂeet, we expect that the unit cost of harvesting will be of the form (28) if
changes in the harvest in the short-run are small. Because Section 4.1 established
a relationship between the biological production function (13) and the economic
production function (20), with the deﬁnition of stock given by (16), F can be used
as the control variable in the model, and the cost can be calculated using (28).
4.3. Cost model parameters. The parameters for the cost model for the two
ﬂeets (Table 1) are estimated for the North Sea on the basis of the accounting statis-
tics, the landing statistics, and the ICES (International Council for Exploration of
the Sea) stock assessment summaries (ICES [2010b]) (see supporting material A).
The unit cost model (28) has two parameters A, γ and one variable S. The value of
γ is independent of how S is measured as long as it is proportional to the density of
the ﬁsh in the sea. However, the value of A will depend upon the way S is measured,
and there is no way to get from the spawning stock biomass, the metric of ICES,
to the density of ﬁsh per m3, the metric of the model. The approach taken is to
calibrate the model to give a unit cost that is similar to the one observed in the
data. However, the rent in today’s ﬁshery is zero (supporting material A Tables 2
and 3). The ﬁshery where transferable quotas were ﬁrst introduced in Denmark
was the herring and mackerel ﬁshery (as a test in 2003, permanent since 2007); this
is likely the most cost-eﬃcient ﬁshery in Denmark, and we assume that the other
sectors would be as eﬃcient if properly managed. Hence, the constant A is found by
setting the rent to 15.57% of the revenue in a ﬁshery that resembles today’s ﬁshery
in the North Sea.
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TABLE 1. Parameter estimates for the price and cost models.
Parameter Estimate Std. error Units
P 0.1610 0.0053 € kg−1

 4.830 0.51 € kg−1
b 0.0295 0.00096 kg
a 5.38 0.25 kg
ι 0.5230 0.0039
γf 0.175 0.037
γl 0.280 0.016
Af 0.05748 Calibrated € kg−1
Al 0.2759 Calibrated € kg−1
4.4. Price model. The price model is estimated using data from the Danish
Landing Statistics (estimation details in supporting material B). Two price models
are needed: pf for the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet, and pl for the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. The forage
ﬁsh ﬂeet lands ﬁsh for reduction into ﬁshmeal. Because there is no size sorting in
the landings, we assume a ﬂat price with respect to the size of the landed ﬁsh:
pf(w) = P.(30)
The large ﬁsh ﬂeet lands ﬁsh for human consumption. The prices depend upon
the size, grade, and species. In the model, the size is presented as a dimension;
therefore, it is appropriate to give the price as a function of the size
pl(w) =
{

 (1− exp (− ((w − b)/a)ι)) , w ≥ b,
0, else.(31)
The function (31) is a scaled Weibull distribution function. Standard errors
(Table 1) are based on resampling (Efron and Tibshirani [1993]) leading to a coef-
ﬁcient of variation below 0.004.
Revenue for ﬂeet i are found as
Ri = Fi
∫ ∞
0
pi(w)ωi(w)N(w)w dw,(32)
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FIGURE 2. Calculation of the change in the beneﬁt caused by a change in the forage ﬁsh
ﬂeet. The starting point of the calculation is a steady state. At time t = 0, the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet
ﬁshing mortality is slightly changed (increased), while the ﬁshing mortality of the large ﬁsh
ﬂeet is unchanged. The change in the ﬁshing mortality leads to a change in the production
(upper panel) and the rent (lower panel) of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet (solid lines) and the large ﬁsh
ﬂeet (dashed lines). All lines are changes, that is, deviations from the equilibrium situation
before the change.
and rent
πi = Ri − yiAiS−γi(33)
with yi and Si as, respectively, (13) and (16).
5. Results. To illustrate the calculation of the beneﬁt indicator, the state of
the current North Sea ﬁshery is examined. We assume that the mean landings over
the period from 2001 to 2009 represent the sustainable harvest that the North Sea
can deliver in its present state. The mean landing is 1,990,304 ton year−1 (ICES
[2010a]); half is assumed to be from the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet and half from the large ﬁsh
ﬂeet. Our simulations depart from a model system in equilibrium with these services
and the beneﬁt indicators are calculated with a social discount rate of ρ = 3% pa.
A change in the ﬁshing mortality of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet impacts the production
and rent of both ﬂeets. Figure 2 illustrates the data from the simulation explained
in Section 3.1. Initially, the harvest of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet shows a big increase,
followed by a reduction that levels out at approximately half of the initial increase.
The rent of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet increases initially, but eventually it levels out close to
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FIGURE 3. Illustration of the beneﬁt indicator method caused by a change in the large ﬁsh
ﬂeet. The change in ﬁshing mortality leads to a change in the production (upper panel) and
the rent (lower panel) of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet (solid lines) and the large ﬁsh ﬂeet (dashed lines).
All lines are changes, that is, deviations from the equilibrium situation before the change.
zero. The reason that the rent approaches zero, despite the increase in the harvest,
is due to a slight decrease in the density of ﬁsh; even though the elasticity of the
unit cost with respect to the density is only γ = 0.175, the result is a slight increase
in the unit cost that aﬀects the harvest of the entire ﬂeet. For the large ﬁsh ﬂeet,
change in ﬁshing mortality of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet results in a slight drop in the
harvest followed by a sustained increase in harvest volume. Despite the increase in
the harvest of the large ﬂeet, the rent decreases. This decrease is due to a decrease
in the size of the ﬁsh in the large ﬁsh ﬂeet’s harvest that leads to a lower market
value. The beneﬁt indicator for the two ﬂeets per forage ﬁsh is calculated according
to (12). The internal beneﬁt to the forage ﬂeet is a slight increase, but it is oﬀset by
the much larger decrease in external beneﬁts to the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. The total beneﬁt
of an increase in forage ﬁshing in the North Sea today is, therefore, clearly negative.
The consequences of a change in the large ﬁsh ﬂeet’s ﬁshing mortality rate can be
evaluated in a similar manner (Figure 3). The production of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet shows
the same pattern as the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet, with an initial high extra harvest followed
by oscillations and settling at approximately half of the initial amount. The harvest
of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet increases initially due to the decreased predation pressure,
but later it approaches zero as the predators again increase in number, although
to a slightly smaller number than before. The change in the rent of the forage ﬁsh
ﬂeet is negligible, while the rent of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet shows an initial increase (the
dashed line start at positive values) followed by a drastic decrease. This decrease in
the rent, despite the increase in harvest, is caused by two things: a slight decrease in
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TABLE 2. The beneﬁt indicators of the present use of the North Sea.
With respect to Forage ﬁsh ﬂeet Large ﬁsh ﬂeet
Internal beneﬁt Bf/f 4.5 €ton−1 Bl/l −1093 €ton−1
External beneﬁt Bl/f −71.6 €ton−1 Bf/l −3 €ton−1
Total beneﬁt B•/f −67.1 €ton−1 B•/l −1096 €ton−1
the ﬁsh density, which increases the unit cost, and a decrease in size of the harvested
ﬁsh, which decreases the market value. The total beneﬁt of an increase in the large
ﬁsh ﬂeet in the North Sea today is negative and, in magnitude, higher than the
externality imposed by the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet. Both beneﬁt indicators of the present
use of the North Sea are negative (Table 2), the beneﬁt of the ecosystem services
from the North Sea could be improved by reducing both ﬂeets’ harvests.
Figure 4 presents the internal and external beneﬁt indicators calculated with a
discount rate of ρ = 3% pa. The axis in the diagram is the sustainable harvest, that
is, the harvest from an ecosystem in equilibrium with constant ﬁshing mortality.
The sustainable harvest is then an indicator for the state of the ecosystem. The zero
contour lines in the two internal panels cross one another at point A. At this point
society optimizes the beneﬁt from the two services but ignores the externality. The
negative externalities amount to −132 €ton−1 inﬂicted on the large ﬁsh ﬂeet for the
marginal ﬁsh caught by the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet and −12 €ton−1 on the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet
for the marginal ﬁsh caught by the large ﬁsh ﬂeet.
To ﬁnd a global optimum, the total beneﬁt indicator must be considered
(Figure 5). The optimum is where the total beneﬁt of the two ﬂeets is zero (point
B). This point may be reached by approximately halving the harvests of the two
ﬂeets.
The external beneﬁt from the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet (0–150 €ton−1) generally far exceeds
the internal beneﬁt (0–30 €ton−1). This phenomenon implies that the management
of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet should consider the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. The zero contour line of
the total beneﬁt indicator for the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet follows diagonals up left and right
from point B (Figure 5). This result indicates that the optimal forage ﬁsh harvest
is dependent upon the volume of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet’s harvest.
In contrast, in absolute values, the internal beneﬁt of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet
(0–1000 €ton−1) generally dwarfs the external beneﬁt (0–12 €ton−1). Thus, the
inﬂuence of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet on the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet is rather small, and it can,
for practical purposes, be ignored. The zero contour line for the large ﬁsh ﬂeet in
Figure 5 is vertical, indicating that the optimal harvest level of the large ﬁsh ﬂeet
is independent of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet.
A striking result of Figure 4 is that the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet can create a positive
externality for the large ﬁsh ﬂeet. To understand the mechanism behind this result,
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FIGURE 4. The beneﬁt indicators (€ton−1 ) for the North Sea forage ﬁsh ﬂeet (top) and large
ﬁsh ﬂeet (bottom) divided into internal beneﬁt, Bi/ i , and external beneﬁt, Bi/ j . Four points
of special interest are marked: the plus sign is the current state of the North Sea, A is where
the internal beneﬁts of the two ﬂeets cross, B is where the total beneﬁts of the two ﬂeets
cross (Figure 5), and C is an arbitrarily chosen point where the externality on the large ﬁsh
ﬂeet from the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet is positive.
the population levels at three points, marked A, B, and C in Figures 4 and 5 are
examined (Figure 6). As the harvest of the forage ﬁsh is increased, i.e., moves from
point C to B, the abundance of large forage ﬁsh within the size selection function
decreases, as a response to the increased ﬁshing pressure. The decreased abundance
of the forage ﬁsh releases the predation pressure on smaller individuals in the size
range of 1–10 g. The decreased abundance of large forage ﬁsh aﬀects the large ﬁsh in
two opposite ways: (i) it removes some of the food for the largest ﬁsh (>1 kg), and
(ii) it reduces the competition for food for the juvenile individuals of the large ﬁsh.
Moving from C to B, the eﬀect of the reduced competition appears most important
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FIGURE 5. Total beneﬁt indicator (€ton−1 ) for the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet, B•/f (left), and the large
ﬁsh ﬂeet, B•/l (right). The points marked are the same as in Figure 4.
because the large ﬁsh generally increase in abundance. Only when moving from B to
A are the very large ﬁsh (>5 kg) negatively aﬀected by the lower abundance of food
from the forage ﬁsh. The impact on abundance is modest, but because the price of
the large ﬁsh is high, this reduction is responsible for the negative externality at
high harvest rates.
6. Discussion and conclusion. We have developed a general methodology
to analyze the internal and external consequences of ﬁshing an ecosystem in terms
of the beneﬁt indicator. The method has been applied to quantify the externalities
that a forage ﬁsh ﬂeet and a large ﬁsh ﬂeet in the North Sea generate for one
another. The generalization of the methodology to more than two ecosystem services
is straightforward. Even though the model is calibrated to resemble the North
Sea, it builds on analysis of size-spectra properties generally found across marine
ecosystems. The results, therefore, have general value and may be applied to other
systems, at least in qualitative terms.
Economic analyses often look at the ﬁrst-order derivative, known as the margin.
This gives easy interpretative indicator, as for example, Weitzman’s [2003] station-
ary rate of return.4 The Weitzman’s [2003] stationary rate of return give an easy
interpretable number to compare with the discount rate. We have here developed
an indicator to inform about the trade-oﬀ when exploiting a marine ecosystem–
based on marginal analysis, equation (4). As we deﬁne our indicator based on
an equilibrium situation, our indicator resembles Weitzman’s [2003] stationary
approach. However, the marine ecosystem is dynamic, and cannot instantly go from
one equilibrium situation to another; there is a dynamic path that has economic
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FIGURE 6. Abundance of ﬁsh as a function of individual size (both axes logarithmic) at the
points A–C in Figures 4 and 5; A is dotted, B is solid, and C is dashed. The abundance of
forage ﬁsh (top) and large ﬁsh (bottom) is scaled relative to the unﬁshed situation. The gray
regions illustrate each ﬂeet’s selection function.
implications. The indicator is designed to capture this dynamic, by discounting
both the economic and physical changes.
While using the method of discounting seems to be widely accepted for aggre-
gating the economic outcome for a (inﬁnite) time ﬂow, equation (2), using the
method of discounting of the physical eﬀect, equation (1), seems to encounter some
skepticism.5 This is, however, a method widely used in cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
in health technology assessment, recommended for example by National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE [2012]), and suggested for natural resource
policy prioritizing (Kronbak and Vestergaard [2013]). Discounting is time prefer-
ence, that is, to get present utility, future beneﬁt is weighted by a positive factor
less than one, and declining the farther into the future the beneﬁt is available.
The rational behind the time preference can be return on opportunity investment,
society’s productivity growth, impatience, and combinations of these factors. Irre-
spective of rationale the beneﬁt we care about is the utility of goods and services.
The money value is just a convenient concept for summing the utility into one value.
If rational, it follows that it is the same time preference factor that is applied to
all entities. It is then the same discount rate that has to be applied to monetary
values and physical entities (for further explanation, see Brent 2003 and Kronbak
and Vestergaard 2013).
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An alternative to our beneﬁt indicator would be the discounted value of the cash
ﬂow with a change in ﬁshing mortality rate or ﬁshing eﬀort. Both ﬁshing mortality
rate and ﬁshing eﬀort are model variables with no tangible physical realization,
that is, they exist only as estimated variables in models. It is impossible to show
or measure ﬁshing mortality in nature without the help from a model; people not
familiar with ﬁsh models, e.g., ﬁshers and politicians, will therefore have diﬃculties
in interpreting an indicator based on ﬁshing mortality. We therefore choose to use
a well-known physical entity, the quantity of removed ﬁsh, as denominator in our
indicator. Another approach would be to ﬁnd an implicit discount rate similar to
the Weitzman’s [2003] stationary rate of return; similarly to the method applied in
Ravn-Jonsen [2011]. However, that will not give an indicator divided into external
and internal eﬀect, and it will only be computable for the part of the ecosystem
states where there is an intertemporal choice of exploitation (Ravn-Jonsen [2011]).
As deﬁned in Section 3, the beneﬁt indicator rests upon a choice of control vari-
able, as the control variable deﬁnes what continue as usual and a change signify.
The choice of ﬁshing mortality as control variable may be seen as representing the
biologist’s view of control variable, whereas the natural choice for a manager or
ﬁsher may be either eﬀort or the total harvest. Eﬀort as control is known in ﬁsh-
ery management as input control, and can, for example, be control over number
of vessels, control over days at sea, control over motor power, etc. Harvest as con-
trol is known as output control and is applied by setting total allowable catch for
the ﬁshery. To analyze the beneﬁt of the diﬀerent kinds of control in a real-world
ﬁshery is beyond the scope of present analysis, however to test how sensitive the
beneﬁt indicator is to the choice of the control variable, the model was reformulated
with two other types of control variables: harvest and ﬁshing cost. Using cost as
control is equivalent to having eﬀort as control if factor input prices are constant.
The results are presented in supporting material E and show consistency with the
found beneﬁt indicator, with the exception of the external beneﬁt from the forage
ﬁsh ﬂeet. For the external beneﬁt of the forage ﬂeet, the zero contour line moves up
so that the value for today’s large ﬁsh ﬁshery changes from −71 €ton−1 with ﬁshing
mortality as the control to 34 €ton−1 with eﬀort as the control to 100 €ton−1 with
harvest as the control. Nevertheless, the general picture and the optimal point are
convergent, which shows that the beneﬁt indicator is a proper indicator of the net
beneﬁt, though the values for the external beneﬁt at the present exploitation rate
must be interpreted cautiously.
The intersection of the zero contour lines of the total beneﬁt indicator in Figure 5
indicates the economic optimum. For simplicity, the decision variables have in the
analysis only two dimensions: the two ﬁshing mortality rates (Ff,Fl). In the real
world, there are many more possibilities for decision variables such as a change
in the size selectivity, a change in the selectivity with respect to the traits, or a
change in the ﬁshing mortality over time. Therefore, it may be possible to increase
the beneﬁt by exploring other dimensions of the decision space.
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In current ﬁshery management, securing the reproduction of the ﬁsh stock is con-
sidered to be an important goal. The ecological model has ﬁxed reproduction, that
is, there is no feedback from the abundance of the adult ﬁsh onto the abundance
of the oﬀspring. This phenomenon is in line with the classic yield-per-recruit anal-
ysis in ﬁsheries science (Beverton and Holt [1957]). Thus, the opportunity cost of
lost reproduction is not part of the beneﬁts calculated in Figures 4 and 5. This ap-
proach is taken to highlight only the trophic system, such that all of the eﬀects stem
from predation and growth of the individual. Therefore, our analysis cannot stand
alone; reproduction must also be considered. The eﬀects on reproduction would be
mostly felt under “recruitment overﬁshing” at high ﬁshing mortalities. The equi-
librium points identiﬁed in our analysis are all at moderate ﬁshing mortality and
are therefore expected to only be weakly inﬂuenced by the lack of representation of
recruitment. The predictions of yields under high exploitation rates will be overpre-
dicted be the model. However, the model indicates the beneﬁt from a substantial
reduction in the harvest, which would simultaneously reduce the probability of re-
production failure. The results are also dependent on the values of the parameters
in the model. The qualitative behavior model is, however, robust to changes in
the parameters (e.g., those related to predator–prey interactions; Andersen and
Pedersen [2010]). Changes to the parameters are therefore expected only to change
the exact values of the equilibrium points, not the qualitative results regarding the
interaction between ﬁshing on small and large species.
The economic aspects of the model consist of a price model and a cost model.
Both of these models are based on data from Denmark; however, because Danish
ﬁsheries are part of the global market, the models are generic. The price model is
divided into two parts: one for forage ﬁsh, and one for large ﬁsh. Large ﬁsh are
regarded as landed for direct human consumption, and we ﬁnd in the supporting
material B that price increases with size, with minor variations from year to year.
We are conﬁdent that the price model reﬂects the willingness of the industry to pay
with respect to size. However, we notice that the price analysis is static, without
the dynamic caused by supply and demand. We leave to future work to incorporate
an economic market in the model.
The cost model is described as a power function of the biomass in the sea. The
model needs two parameters for each ﬂeet, the exponents γi , and the coeﬃcients
Ai . The value of the exponents diﬀer between studies; e.g., Sandberg [2006] found
values in the range of 0.18–0.48 for diﬀerent herring and cod ﬂeets, and Eide et al.
[2003] found 0.42 for cod. Compared to those studies, the values found in this study
(0.18 and 0.28) are on the low end. In supporting material D, the sensitivity of this
parameter is tested by increasing the exponents by a factor of 1.5. The change in γ
does not qualitatively change Figures 4 or 5. The value of the beneﬁt to the forage
ﬁsh ﬂeet is slightly sensitive to a change in the exponent, while the large ﬁsh ﬂeet
is almost insensitive.
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As our model does not use the same stock concepts as the ICES stock assessments,
we have calibrated the coeﬃcients in the cost model so that the present ﬁshery gives
15.57% rent—the same as the best-managed ﬁshery in Denmark. This is a rough
estimate, as the present ﬁshery yields zero rent (supporting material A Tables 2
and 3). In supporting material D, the sensitivity of this calibration is tested by
calibrating under the assumption of zero rent in the present ﬁshery. Again, the
ﬁgures do not change qualitatively; however, the value of the beneﬁt to the forage
ﬁsh ﬂeet is more sensitive to this parameter than is the value to the large ﬁsh ﬂeet.
The reason for this diﬀerence in sensitivity between the two ﬂeets stems from the
underlying price structures: while the large ﬁsh ﬂeet beneﬁts from an increase in
the price caused by the increase in the size of the ﬁsh as a result of the relieved
exploitation level, the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet has a ﬂat price relative to the size of the
ﬁsh. Since both ﬂeets beneﬁt from an increase in density as a result of the relived
exploitation levels in the form of a decreased unit cost. However, for large ﬁsh, the
change in price dominates the change in cost. The economics of the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet
are then dominated by the density eﬀect on the cost, and for the large ﬁsh ﬂeet,
the economics are dominated by the price response to the size of the ﬁsh.
The size-spectrum model has been used for ecological impact assessments of ﬁsh-
ing on the ecosystem (Andersen and Pedersen [2010], Houle et al. [2013], Jacobsen
et al. [2014]). One common impression from those analyses was that a ﬁshery on
the large ﬁsh imposed a positive inﬂuence on the forage ﬁsh, due to the reduced
predation pressure on the forage ﬁsh when the consumer ﬁsh were removed. In con-
trast, the results from present model, as presented in Figure 4, uncover that the
externality on the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet generated by the large ﬁsh ﬂeet is ignorable. The
externality is ignorable because it is dwarfed by the intertemporal cost in the large
ﬁsh ﬂeet’s own ﬁshery if it is not managed close to the optimum. The contrast in
interpretation between present model and the others highlights the importance of
economic analyses over purely ecological analyses of the impact of ﬁshing on an
ecosystem.
Traditional Lotka–Volterra-type models (e.g., May et al. [1979], Flaaten [1988])
predict a positive externality from predator harvesting on forage ﬁsh harvest and a
negative externality from forage ﬁsh harvest on predator harvest. The total beneﬁt
of increased predator harvesting in these models will depend on model formulation
and parameters; often when the predator is valuable, the externality to the prey is
ignorable compared to the rent from the predator (e.g., Agnarsson et al. [2008]).
The reason for the positive externality is obvious: reduced predator abundance
results in lower predation mortality on forage ﬁsh and thus increased productivity
of the forage ﬁshery; a reduction in forage ﬁsh, on the other hand, leads to less food
for predators and consequently lower productivity and lower yield of the consumer
ﬁshery. The unstructured Lotka–Volterra equations are based on the assumption
that only the adult parts of the ﬁsh populations matter. The size-spectrum models
do not rely on this assumption, and explicitly model the entire life history, from
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eggs to adults. This extra degree of realism in the size-spectrum model is the reason
it predicts diﬀerent externalities than Lotka–Volterra type of models.
Size-spectrum models predict situations where the forage ﬁsh ﬂeet generates a neg-
ative externality on the large ﬁsh ﬂeet, but there are situations where they generate
a positive externality. The explanation for this phenomenon must be observed in the
diﬀerent functions the species ﬁll for one another during their lifespan. If we focus
on a mature forage ﬁsh that is approximately 100 g, it will ﬁll three diﬀerent func-
tions with respect to the large ﬁsh species: (i) the function of a predator on larvae
and juveniles, (ii) the function of a competitor to similarly sized ﬁsh, and (iii) the
function of prey for larger ﬁsh. The ﬁrst two have a negative inﬂuence, while the last
has a positive inﬂuence. The economic analysis shows that this triple functionality
leads to a requirement of accommodating the harvest of forage ﬁsh to the explo-
ration of the large ﬁsh. Traditional bioeconomic models have been centered on the
mature ﬁsh. The multispecies models that include interaction among mature levels
that do exist, such as the Lotka–Volterra-type model, are restricted to modeling
predator–prey, competition or mutualism, but not all three at once. Consequently,
these models disregard an important part of the ecological functionality.
6.1. Concluding remarks. Overall, this model shows that the exploitation
of the forage species has a notable economic impact on the large species ﬁsh-
ery, but the reverse is not true. The analysis shows that the na¨ıve perception,
where the forage species is only viewed as food for the large species, is too sim-
ple. The predation of the forage ﬁsh species on the juveniles of the large species
and the competition between the forage ﬁsh species and the juveniles of the large
species can, if the density of the forage ﬁsh is too high, dominate over the function
of the forage ﬁsh as prey. Thus, the harvest of the forage ﬁsh must be adjusted to
the harvest of the large ﬁsh. The present management of the North Sea is, given
the current exploitation rate of the large ﬁsh, not far from having the right forage
ﬁsh harvest. However, the model’s optimal point (481 · 103 ton year−1 , 489 · 103
ton year−1) is approximately half of the current harvest in the North Sea, which
indicates that the present exploitation is too high. To improve the utilization of
the ecosystem, management must acknowledge the externalities that the ﬁsheries
impose upon one another.
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exhibit the form of traveling waves with diminishing amplitudes when the controls are constant.
24 L. RAVN-JONSEN ET AL.
The system is considered to converge to equilibrium when the coeﬃcient of variation over 25 years
in all points is less than 10−8 .
3. Stock is not a traditional production factor for the individual ﬁsher as it is not under his
control. It is more of an exogenous environmental variable. However, in aggregate, that is from a
social viewpoint, the stock is endogenous and can be seen as a traditional production factor.
4. If g(k, k˙) is the net cash ﬂow as a function of capital k and investment k˙, the stationary rate
of return is
R(k) = − gk
gk˙
.
That is, it is a ratio between the marginal cash ﬂow with respect to capital and investment
(Weitzman [2003]).
5. Authors experience from presentations of the paper.
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